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In negotiating his controversial takeover of the Trans Union Cor-
poration (Trans Union), Jay A. Pritzker proposed an initial offer of $55
per share.' The Chief Executive Officer of Trans Union, Jerome W.
Van Gorkom, responded that:
to be sure that $55 was the best price obtainable, Trans Union
should be free to accept any better offer. Pritzker demurred,
stating that his organization would serve as a "stalking horse"
for an "auction contest" only if Trans Union would permit
Pritzker to buy [treasury] shares of Trans Union at market
price which Pritzker could then sell to any higher bidder.2
Ultimately, Pritzker entered into an agreement with Trans Union in
which Pritzker agreed to make a $55 cash offer to Trans Union stock-
holders and in return Trans Union agreed to sell Pritzker one million
treasury shares at the premerger market price of $38 per share.3 While
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1. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867 (Del. 1985). Jerome W. Van Gorkom,
Trans Union's Chief Executive Officer, suggested not only the transaction but the take-
over price. Id. at 866. The Van Gorkom opinion refers to Pritzker as "a well-known cor-
porate takeover specialist and [Van Gorkom's] social acquaintance." Id.
2. Id. at 866.
3. Id. at 868. Treasury shares are issued shares of stock held by the issuing corpo-
ration following their repurchase from the public. See NYSE Listed Company Manual,
Glossary of Frequently Used Terms, vi (1983) (definition of treasury stock). In the
Trans Union takeover, Pritzker bought authorized but unissued shares. Because trea-
sury shares increased the corporation's paid-in capital, the difference between treasury
shares and authorized but unissued shares historically was relevant to legal restrictions
which prohibited corporations from distributing paid-in capital as dividends. See B.
Manning, A Concise Textbook on Legal Capital 45, 130-32 (2d ed. 1981). For the pur-
poses of this Article, however, there is no difference between the two types of shares and
the term "treasury share" will be used throughout. I
A target management may prefer to sell either treasury or "authorized but unis-
sued" shares, because shareholders must approve any increase in the number of author-
ized shares. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(a)(3), (b)(l)-(2) (1983); Revised
Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 2.02(a)(2), 10.03 (1984). It may be difficult for target manage-
ment to gain approval for such a sale: "During a bidding war, of course, the sharehold-
ers would not approve [a lock-up] deal, but would prefer a free and unhampered auction
for their shares." R. Clark, Corporate Law § 13.6, at 573 (1986). Moreover, corpora-
tions that trade on the New York Stock Exchange may not increase the amount of out-
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some members of Trans Union's senior management initially objected
to the deal, claiming that it amounted to a "lock-up" which "would in-
hibit other offers,"'4 the deal eventually went on to fruition, and ulti-
mately, litigation.5 In a "lock-up" merger agreement, a bidder's tender
offer is conditioned upon the bidder's receiving the option to purchase
treasury shares of the target corporation at a price below the tender
offer.6 The term "lock-up" seems to derive from the perception that
such agreements "lock-out" other potential bidders that find it eco-
nomically infeasible to enter competing bids for the diluted stock.
Target corporations have employed the tactic of selling treasury
shares to friendly bidders in several takeover contexts,7 leaving the
courts to struggle with the issue of whether treasury sales should be
enjoined because they "lock-up" the bidding process. 8 This Article
takes up the question by examining whether selling treasury shares to a
bidder forecloses or facilitates competitive bids by third parties. By an-
alyzing the bidders' incentives, this Article assesses whether selling
standing common stock by more than 20% percent without shareholder approval.
NYSE Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c) (1989).
4. 488 A.2d at 867-68. The Delaware Supreme Court did not address the substan-
tive propriety of selling treasury shares. Instead, the decision focused on the process
that Trans Union used in accepting the Pritzker offer-that the decision "to approve the
proposed cash-out merger was not the product of an informed business judgment." Id.
at 864. Commentators have found the decision highly controversial. Compare Fischel,
The BusinessJudgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. Law. 1437 (1985) (argu-
ing that business judgment rule should have protected Trans Union directors) with
Macey & Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 Yale LJ. 127 (1988) (arguing that Van
Gorkom court correctly decided liability issue, but asserting that court's holding only
should be applied in the takeover context). The Delaware legislature reacted to the Van
Gorkom decision by passing an indemnification statute which allows corporations to in-
demnify their directors from shareholder derivative liability. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 145 (1983 & Supp. 1988); see also id. § 102(b)(7) (allowing corporations to limit di-
rector liability in certain circumstances).
5. Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL 8774 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
6. See R. Clark, supra note 3, §_ 13.6, at 573.
7. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 366 (2d Cir. 1980) (sale of
treasury shares to white knight accounting for 19.4% of outstanding shares); Frantz
Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401,403-06 (Del. 1985) (transfer of treasury shares to
employee stock ownership plan in order to dilute raider's control); Hecco Ventures v.
Sea-Land Corp., No. 8486, 1986 WL 5840 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1986) (option to purchase
treasury shares equal to 25% of outstanding shares).
8. Compare Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d I (2d Cir.
1983) (option to purchase treasury shares amounting to 66% of target upheld against
Williams Act challenge), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984) and Hastings-Murtagh v.
Texas Air Corp., 649 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (lock-up provisions upheld pursuant
to business judgment rule) with Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1981) (lock-up option to buy treasury shares representing 17% of outstanding shares
enjoined), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden
Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y.) (prevailing bidder's action for rescission of treasury
stock sale to white knight denied), aff'd 717 F.2d 757 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1018 (1983).
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treasury shares can lead to higher takeover bids, and ultimately,
whether target managers selling treasury shares are maximizing their
shareholders' welfare.
A large class of treasury sales will not impede the target's sale to
the highest valuing bidder. Additionally, treasury sales can facilitate
the establishment of a takeover auction for the target thus benefiting
shareholders. This target strategy, however, is not without cost.
Although a treasury sale may be a prerequisite for an auction, selling
treasury shares causes all auction participants to lower their maximum
bids. Moreover, extreme forms of treasury sales 9 can foreclose third
parties with higher target valuations from making competitive bids. In
sum, target shareholders benefit from treasury sales if a takeover auc-
tion with lower bids is better than no auction at all. This Article, there-
fore, proposes a test for when treasury sales cause foreclosure.
Because foreclosure is inconsistent with maximizing shareholder wel-
fare, the Article argues that courts should enjoin or rescind such
sales.' 0
This Article is in four parts. Part I examines how a treasury sale
lowers the reservation price, i.e., the maximum bid, of all potential bid-
ders." Part II shows how, irrespective of this downward pressure on
the prevailing maximum bid, treasury sales can create a takeover auc-
tion that may benefit target shareholders. Part III examines the possi-
bility of foreclosure and proposes a practical standard for determining
whether a treasury sale forecloses third parties from entering an auc-
tion. Such foreclosure represents an agency cost in which target man-
agement places its own interests in incumbency before the
shareholders' interest in maximizing share value.
Part IV discusses additional applications of the analysis developed
earlier in the Article. Specifically, Part IV considers the close analogy
between treasury share sales and greenmail share purchases. Treasury
sales, like greenmail, compensate initial bidders for investments in in-
formation. Treasury sales, however, have an added advantage in that
9. As detailed below, see infra text accompanying note 49, a treasury sale becomes
more "extreme" as the number of treasury shares sold increases or as the price at which
the bidder buys these shares decreases.
10. This foreclosure standard for reviewing director conduct would govern even in
the presence of a provision in the target corporation's articles of incorporation detailing
the circumstances under which treasury sales would be allowed. In that sense, the pro-
posed legal standard is an "immutable" rule. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying
text. See generally Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing when default rules are
appropriate and when inmmutable rules are preferred). Corporations would retain, how-
ever, the ability to adopt restrictions on treasury sales more stringent than the standard
proposed in this Article. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
11. The reservation price is the highest price a bidder would be willing to pay at an
auction. See S.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 17
(2d ed. 1980).
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they increase the probability that the target will ultimately be taken
over at a premium. Consequently, Part IV questions earlier analysis
suggesting that greenmail might be welfare enhancing, 12 and suggests
that target management's choice of greenmail when the superior auc-
tion-creating device of treasury sales exists borders on prima facie evi-
dence of target management malefide.
Part IV also considers the sale of treasury shares to subsequent
bidders or "white knights." Although a treasury sale to a white knight
allows the target corporation to free-ride on the informational invest-
ments of the initial bidder, it can also be an efficient form of resistance
to hostile offers by inducing third parties to investigate the target and
by buying time more cheaply for the development of a takeover auc-
tion. Finally, Part IV extends the Article's analysis to asset lock-ups and
ancillary provisions of treasury sales, such as restrictions on the release
of proprietary information, that can inform a court's scrutiny of target
managements' business judgment.
I. THE Ex POST INCENTIVES
A. The Effect of Treasury Share Sales on the Initial Bidder
To understand how treasury shares affect the incentives of an ini-
tial bidder, consider again the sale of 1 million treasury shares to Jay
Pritzker as a condition of his $55 single-tier,' 3 all-cash bid for Trans
Union. The starting point of the analysis is to realize that as the sale
price of Trans Union is bid up, Pritzker's profits from winning the auc-
tion decrease 14 but that his profits from losing the auction and "cashing
in" his treasury shares increase.15 At some point Pritzker will have no
incentive to match third-party bids because the profits from tendering
12. See Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95
Yale LJ. 13, 43-48 (1985).
13. Single-tiered or any-and-all takeover bids are made for 100% of the target com-
pany stock at a uniform price. See id. at 20; cf. Barron's Dictionary of Finance and
Investment Terms 449 (2d ed. 1987) (contrasting definition of two-tiered bids with any-
and-all bids). In contrast, two-tiered bids consist of a first tier offer to buy a controlling
block of the target's stock at a per share price which is higher than the second tier offer
to buy the remaining shares. See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 & n.2
(S.D. Ohio 1982) (cited in Macey & McChesney, supra note 12, at 19 n.26). See gener-
ally R. Clark, supra note 3, § 11.2 (collecting and analyzing arguments regarding two-
tier offers). Two-tiered offers are analyzed in the appendix, see infra p. 716. As dis-
cussed there, the effect of treasury sales is not substantively changed.
14. Pritzker earns less on the original outstanding shares because he must pay a
higher purchase price. The higher purchase price for the treasury shares, however, does
not affect Pritzker's profits if he is successful. From Pritzker's perspective, the purchase
of the treasury shares is a "wash" should he win the auction because in "tendering"
treasury shares to himself, Pritzker will realize only the capital he paid in. Since Pritzker
is on both sides of the transaction, what Pritzker "the seller" earns on the discounted
treasury shares equals what Pritzker "the buyer" loses. See infra note 20.
15. Higher bids increase Pritzker's profits from losing a takeover because Pritzker
will be able to tender his newly purchased treasury shares to the auction "winner" for an
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the treasury stock will exceed the profits of a takeover. Most impor-
tantly, Pritzker will reach this indifference point before the bidding
reaches his valuation of Trans Union because as the bidding ap-
proaches his reservation price Pritzker's profits from a takeover ap-
proach zero while his profits from losing the takeover continue to
increase. This tradeoff is displayed in Figure 1 in which the takeover
profits and the treasury share profits for Pritzker are graphed for vari-
ous bids.





Assuming that the value of the firm to Pritzker (VI) is $60 per
share, the profits from takeover become progressively smaller as
Pritzker raises his bid. For example, if Pritzker raised his bid to $60,
there would be no profit from the takeover because Pritzker would pay
$60 for stock that he valued at $60. Higher bids by third parties, how-
ever, would increase the profits that Pritzker would earn from the trea-
sury shares because Pritzker could tender those shares for higher
prices.
Consequently, Pritzker has an incentive to match a third-party bid
only when the profits from takeover are greater than the profits from
even higher price. In other words, if Pritzker is going to lose, he should prefer high
third-party bids.
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tendering treasury shares to a third-party bidder. As shown in Figure
1, there exists a point (B,*) below Pritzker's reservation price at which the
profits from losing the takeover (and tendering) begin to exceed the
profits from winning the takeover. The intersection of these two profit
lines thus determines the maximum amount that Pritzker will bid in re-
sponse to competing bids from third parties.
More generally, we can derive the maximum bid that the purchaser
of treasury shares will make with a little algebra. Let:
N = the number of original outstanding target shares,
V, = the per share value to the initial bidder,
P = the price of treasury shares,
T = the number of treasury shares,
B, = the initial bidder's bid, and
B3 = the third party's bid.
The profits to Pritzker from winning the takeover bidding contest
equal:
(1) (V- B)N,
and the profits to Pritzker from losing the takeover contest and tender-
ing the treasury stock to a third-party are:
(2) (B3 - P)T.
Because Pritzker would only be willing to match (or slightly beat) a
higher third-party offer if the profits from winning the takeover ex-
ceeded the profits of tendering the treasury stock, the maximum
amount Pritzker would bid can be derived by setting equation (1) equal
to equation (2) and solving for a common B. With a little algebraic
manipulation, this maximum bid (B,*) equals:
(3) B,* - (VIN + PT)/(N + T).
B,* represents Pritzker's reservation price for the target after the
purchase of treasury shares and corresponds to the intersection of the
two profit lines in Figure 1. Intuitively, the profits from the treasury
shares will be larger if there are more treasury shares or if the treasury
price is lower, so that either an increase in the number of treasury
shares or a reduction in the treasury price will decrease B,*, the maxi-
mum bid amount.' 6
Before buying any shares, a rational bidder should be willing to bid
16. By inspecting equation (3), we see that B,* will increase as either V, or P in-
creases. By taking the derivative of equation (3) with respect to T and N we find that B,*
will increase as N increases but decrease as T increases. These derivatives are:
1990]
HeinOnline -- 90 Colum. L. Rev.  687 1990
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
up to V1 per share to take over the company.17 The purchase of trea-
sury stock reduces the amount that a rational bidder would be willing to
bid because BI* is strictly less than VI:
(4) V - B,* = T (V - P)/(T + N) > 0.
Treasury purchases thus effectively reduce a rational bidder's reserva-
tion price for the company. If a bidding war ensues, the purchaser will
start preferring loss to victory before the auction reaches V1, the trea-
sury purchaser's valuation.18 Bidders with treasury shares bid less be-
cause there is an opportunity cost associated with increasing their
bids. 19 Raising their bid (and thereby possibly winning the auction)
forgoes the possibility of profiting from the treasury shares because
bidders profit from the treasury shares only if they lose the auction. 20
The purchaser of treasury shares therefore commits itself to bidding
less than its per share valuation of the target.2 1
The foregoing analysis can be applied directly to the facts of
Pritzker's takeover of Trans Union as developed in the Delaware
Supreme Court's Smith v. Van Gorkom 22 decision. The trial record indi-
cates that approximately thirteen million shares were initially outstand-
ing, and that Pritzker bought one million authorized but unissued
shares for $38 per share, so that N = 13 million; T = 1 million; and P
= $38.23 While Pritzker never explicitly revealed what Trans Union
dB,*/dT = N(P - V,)/T + N)2 < 0; and
dB1*/dN = T(V - P)/T + N)2 > 0.
17. Formally, a rational bidder would be willing to bid up to an amount slightly less
than its value, VI - E, where E is an arbitrarily small number.
18. Because the profit line in Figure 1 for losing the takeover is upward sloping, the
intersection which defines B,* must be to the left of V.
19. "Opportunity cost" can be defined as "the price that you pay for things that you
might have done." B. Joel, Only the Good Die Young (1977).
20. Bidders with treasury shares earn no extra profits if they win the auction. If the
bidders win the auction, they recover the capital generated by the sale of these shares,
but this capital is their own money. This can be demonstrated with the use of a little
algebra: without a treasury share sale, a bidder pays BIN for a firm that it values at VIN.
With a treasury share sale, a bidder pays BIN + PT for a firm that it values at VIN + PT.
In either case, the profits from winning the auction will be (VI - B,)N.
For a two-tiered bid, the purchase of treasury shares can increase the profits from
winning because the bidder can reduce the number of shares included in the higher cost
front-end from N/2 to (N - T)/2.
21. As calculated in equation (4), the magnitude of this reduction in the reservation
price is a positive function of the number of pre-tender shares purchased and the bidder
per share valuation, and a negative function of the pre-tender purchase price and the
number of outstanding shares. These results can be calculated by taking the derivative
of equation (4) with respect to its component parts. For example, the derivative of this
equation with respect to the number of purchased treasury shares, T, equals:
N(V - P)I(T + N)2.
22. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
23. Id. at 867. The opinion indicates that "Van Gorkom multiplied [$55] per share
by the number of shares outstanding to reach a total value of the Company of $690
million." Id. at 866. This implies that there were 12.54 million shares outstanding
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was worth to him, Donald Romans, Trans Union's Chief Financial Of-
ficer, had estimated the per share value to be between $55 and $65.24
If we again assume that Trans Union was worth (V =) $60 per share to
Pritzker,2 5 then we can calculate the effect of selling the treasury shares
to Pritzker. By substituting these values into equation (3), we see that
after buying the treasury shares Pritzker would not have any incentive
to raise his bid above (B1* =) $58.43-even though he thought Trans
Union was worth $60 per share. If a third party had bid higher than
$58.43, Pritzker would have preferred to profit from tendering the trea-
sury shares.
All the facts in this analysis are readily available from the trial rec-
ord except for V1, Pritzker's valuation of Trans Union. Since Pritzker did
not (and indeed could not credibly) notify the market of how much the
shares were worth to him, third parties could not have determined
Pritzker's reservation price (B1*) with precision. Third party estimates
of B1 * will turn, like ours, on independent estimates of intrinsic value of
the type provided in the Van Gorkom decision. 26
In addition to lowering the maximum bid the treasury share recipi-
ent will make, the purchase of treasury shares also serves to guarantee
the recipient a minimum profit from the takeover. In the Trans Union
context, for example:
(a) If no one matches Pritzker's original $55 bid, Pritzker will
win the auction and earn $65 million (from equation (1),
($60 - $55) 13 million);
(b) If a third party tenders a competing bid less than or equal
to $58.43, Pritzker will respond with a slightly higher bid
($690 million/$55). For computational simplicity, the textual analysis assumes 13 mil-
lion shares outstanding. Id. at 866.
24. Id. at 867.
25. It is reasonable to expect that Pritzker would bid less than his true value-so
that he would make $5 per share on his original $55 bid.
26. From the fact that Pritzker was willing to offer $55 we can deduce at least a
lower bound for Pritzker's valuation (VI). Equation (3) calculates the maximum amount
that a rational bidder with treasury shares would be willing to bid for the target (B,*).
Since the initial bid (B,) should be less than or equal to this maximum bid, one can
derive a minimum estimate of Pritzker's value (VI"' ") by substituting known values into
equation (3):
B/ < B* = [VIN + PT]/(N + T).
Solving this inequality for V, yields Vi"', the minimum per share value for a rational
bidder:
Vt"' = (BIN + T(B,' - P)]/N.
Substituting the values for the Trans Union takeover indicates that Pritzker must have at
least valued Trans Union at $56.31 per share if he was willing to bid $55 following the
treasury sale:
V11" > $56.31.
In discussing the possibility of foreclosure, this Article will show that the initial offer
B/' can at times be greater than Bl*. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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and profit by taking over Trans Union for less than his val-
ues ($60); and
(c) If a third-party enters a competing bid greater than
$58.43, Pritzker will not match it, but will still profit by
tendering his treasury shares.
In any case, Pritzker is "guaranteed" at least the amount of profit at the
intersection of the lines in Figure 1. At that point Pritzker would be
indifferent between taking over the firm and letting third parties pre-
vail. These guaranteed profits can be derived from either equation (1)
or (2) to equal:
(V - B,*)N = (B1* - P)T.
In Van Gorkom, Pritzker would have been guaranteed at least $20.4 mil-
lion whether or not he won a bidding war with third parties. From
Pritzker's perspective, the treasury shares can be viewed as a form of
auction insurance. Even if Pritzker loses the auction he will receive
more than 30% of the profits from taking over the firm for $55 per
share ($20.4 million/$65 million = .313).
As shown in Figure 1, the sale of treasury stock to Pritzker created
a "profit valley"-a guaranteed lrofit at the bottom but higher profits
on either side. Accordingly, Pritzker would not want to enter into a
bidding war with third parties unless he were either going to win big or
lose big. Indeed, Pritzker theoretically might have incentives to bid
higher than B,* if he felt that he could force a competing third party to
bid higher. Under this scenario, Pritzker would be like the shill at an
auction, acting as an agent of the seller to bid up the price, while trying
actually not to buy. Pritzker, like the shill, would then receive a cut of
the higher auctioned sale price-Pritzker's cut coming in the higher
value of his treasury shares. But this is a risky strategy if Pritzker did
not know what the third parties are willing to pay. The risk that
Pritzker might end up buying the corporation should greatly under-
mine Pritzker's incentives to bid above B1*.
B. The Effect of Open Market Purchases on the Initial Bidder
The analysis changes significantly when a bidder acquires out-
standing shares on the open market 27 because while treasury share
purchases reduce a bidder's reservation price, open market purchases
do not. Bidders that purchase treasury shares profit from the treasury
shares only if they lose the auction.28 Winning bidders do not profit
from owning treasury shares because they merely tender these addi-
27. The Williams Act allows potential bidders to buy up to five percent of a com-
pany's outstanding stock before declaring a tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1988).
Bidders routinely take advantage of this rule and buy as many shares as possible at the
lower pre-tender offer price.
28. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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tional shares to themselves. 29 A rational bidder's reservation price is
reduced to account for the opportunity cost associated with winning an
auction.
Winning bidders do profit from open market purchases, however,
because these lower-priced purchases reduce the number of shares that
need to be purchased at the higher tender offer price from other share-
holders. Bidders purchasing shares on the open market thus profit
from these purchases whether they win or lose the auction so that open
market purchases do not engender the same sort of opportunity cost.
Moreover, the bidders' profit, the difference between the purchase
price and the tender price, is the same whether the bidders tender the
open market shares to a third party or "tender" the shares to them-
selves. A bidder making open market purchases, therefore, will con-
tinue to bid up to that bidder's particular valuation of the target.
For example, if Pritzker had purchased his million shares from the
market, rather than from Trans Union's treasury, he should still be will-
ing to raise his tender offer up to his per share valuation, V1 . At this
price, he would not have profited from the tendered shares, but he
would have gained (VI - P)T on the shares he had purchased on the
open market (at price P). Thus, although Pritzker would have earned
less on the tendered shares as the tender offer increased, his profit
from the open market purchases would have been constant for any bid
up to V1. These effects are depicted in Figure 2.
Unlike the profits from treasury shares, the profits from open mar-
ket shares are added to the profits from tendered shares to calculate the
total profits from winning the takeover auction. The profits from win-
ning the merger will equal the vertical sum of the profits from the ten-
dered shares and the profits from the open market purchases:
(6) (V, - B,)(N - T) + (V - P)T.
The second term of equation (6) shows that the profits from the open
market purchases are unaffected by the size of B, as long as the initial
bidder wins the takeover auction.
If a third party bids B3 > V1, then the initial bidder will prefer to
lose the takeover contest and tender its open market shares for a profit
of (B3 - P)T-represented in Figure 2 by the upward sloping Open
Market Profits line. Following open market purchases, a bidder would
still bid up to V, because only third-party bids above this amount cause
a bidder to profit more from losing the takeover. Purchasing shares
from the open market, therefore, does not lower the bidder's reserva-
tion price.3 0 As intuition would suggest, a person who believes the firm
29. See supra notes 14, 20.
30. From equation (6), we also can see that V is the reservation price because the
first term becomes negative if B, exceeds V1, i.e., while the profit from the open-market
purchases enables a bidder to bid above its reservation price and still earn a profit, the
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FIGURE 2: How OPEN MARKET PURCHASES AFFECT BIDDER PROFITS
Total Profits
Profits from Tendere Shares
Profits from Open Market Shares
Bids
to be worth V1 will hav& an incentive to bid up to V, for the firm.3'
Thus, although treasury share purchases reduce an initial bidder's res-
ervation price, open market share purchases do not.
Figure 2 indicates that open market purchases "guarantee" the ini-
tial bidder a minimum profit from the takeover auction, because even
the lowest point of the profit valley insures positive profits.3 2 The sec-
ond term of equation (6) indicates that, as is the case with treasury
share purchases, this insurance flows from profits made on share
purchases consummated outside of the tender offer transaction, (V -
bidder will not do so because it can realize a larger profit by tendering its shares
purchased on the open market to the higher-valuing third-party bidder.
31. There are models of the "winner's curse" in which bidders do not know with
certainty what the firm will be worth to them. To compensate for the tendency for the
auction winner to overbid (the curse), all bidders systematically reduce how much they
will bid. See Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 597, 625
(1989).
32. A prospective bidder has an incentive to buy as much stock as it can at the pre-
tender offer price because it is cheaper to buy the stock outside of the tender offer. The
provision of the Williams Act which allows prospective bidders to purchase five percent
of a target's outstanding stock before announcing a tender offer, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)
(1988), is analogous to the 17-year patent protection allowed by federal law. See 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1982). Both are limited grants of monopoly power that compensate indi-
viduals who invest to develop socially valuable information.
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P)T. The crucial difference between treasury share and open market
purchases, however, is that with treasury share purchases the profit val-
ley (and therefore the reservation price) is centered at B1 *, while with
open market purchases the reservation price remains fixed at V1. 33
In sum, both open market and treasury share purchases "guaran-
tee" a bidder a profit from a takeover auction whether or not the bidder
ultimately enters the highest bid. These two sources of pre-tender offer
shares, however, have dramatically different effects on a bidder's maxi-
mum bid. Open market purchases of target stock should not reduce a
bidder's reservation price while treasury share purchases should. Bid-
ders can only profit from treasury shares by losing an auction. This
analysis shows that at some point in competitive bidding, rational bid-
ders holding treasury shares will drop out of auctions at bids below
their valuation (BI < VI) because, as shown in Figure 1, they prefer to
profit from their treasury shares rather than match a rival's bid. Raising
a bid thus entails the opportunity cost of profiting on treasury shares.
Courts have often failed to recognize this opportunity cost.3 4 By
purchasing treasury shares, a bidder effectively promises to drop out of
subsequent auctions at a price below its subjective valuation. This com-
mitment to a reduced reservation price will crucially inform our subse-
quent discussion of foreclosure.
C. The Effect of Treasury Share Sales on Third-Party Bidders
The preceding analysis suggests that the sale of treasury stock to
bidders (such as Pritzker) lowers the maximum amount they would be
willing to bid for a target company. This by itself indicates a form of
"self-foreclosure": purchasing treasury shares might disadvantage the
purchaser in any subsequent takeover auctions. To determine whether
selling treasury stock to an initial bidder inhibits or facilitates the crea-
tion of an auction market, however, it is important to see how the trea-
sury sale affects the maximum bids of third parties as well.
At first, it might seem that treasury stock purchases would raise a
33. These and the following results do not change if the initial bidder purchases
shares from both the corporate treasury and the open market. Although both types of
purchases guarantee a minimum profit from the takeover auction, only treasury share
purchases reduce the bidder's reservation price. Thus, the foregoing analysis, see supra
notes 14-21, applies to the "usual" situation in which the purchaser of treasury shares
will also purchase the Williams Act limit from the open market. For simplicity, however,
the subsequent analysis focuses on sales of treasury shares to bidders who own no other
stock in the company.
34. In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), for example,
the court struck down a stock lock-up because it was less costly for the recipient to raise
its bid than for its rivals: "[E]very dollar raise in the bid by USS [the treasury share
recipient] would cost USS $30 million, while each such dollar raise would cost Mobil $47
million." Id. at 375. In reaching this conclusion, the court ignored the opportunity cost
that USS faced in raising its bid-literally millions of dollars in foregone profits from
tendering its treasury shares to the rival bidder, Mobil.
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third party's reservation price (maximum bid) because the initial bidder
in purchasing treasury stock contributes real assets to the corporation
(equalling PT). This initial intuition ignores, however, the fact that the
treasury shares, as in the Trans Union example, are usually purchased
at prices below the purchaser's tender offer. Selling these additional
treasury shares at a price that does not include the post-merger syner-
gistic value effectively "dilutes" the synergistic value of the outstanding
shares, and thus reduces the maximum amount that a third party would
be willing to bid.3 5
For example, in Van Gorkom the treasury sale required third parties
to purchase 14 million shares of stock instead of the pre-sale 13 million
shares. The diluting of synergistic value stands at the heart of the
plaintiff's claim that the treasury sale "was a 'lock up' and amounted to
'an agreed merger as opposed to an offer.' "36 It is to this crucial claim
that we now turn our attention.
Let the total value of the target to a third party equal NV3. Before a
treasury sale to the initial bidder, the maximum amount that the third
party would bid per share would be simply its per share value, V3:
(7) V3 = NV3/N.
After the treasury sale to the initial bidder, however, this reservation
price decreases because the third party has to buy more stock (N + T),
but the target corporation does not gain proportionally more assets.
Thus, the third-party bidder has to buy (N + T) shares of stock which it
only values at (NV3 + PT). Accordingly, the third party's maximum bid
after the treasury sale, B;*, falls to:
(8) B 3* = (NV3 + PT)/(N + T).
As described above, the synergistic value of the merged target (re-
flected in the fact that V3 > P) is diluted by the treasury sale. The sale
causes a third party's reservation price to fall from V3 to B3*. 3 7 This fall
in a third party's maximum bid raises the possibility that the treasury
sale may inhibit third parties from making competitive bids for the firm.
The treasury sale not only reduces what the initial bidder is willing to
bid for the target, but it also reduces what all third parties are willing to
offer.
35. This is in contrast to open market purchases by an initial bidder which do not
dilute the synergistic value and therefore do not affect the maximum amount that a third
party would bid. Cf. supra pp. 690-92 (open-market purchases by initial bidder reduce
the number of shares which must be purchased).
36. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 868 (Del. 1985).
37. The fall in reservation price:
V3 - B3* = T(V, - P)/(N + T),
is greater than zero if V3 > P.
694 [Vol. 90:682
HeinOnline -- 90 Colum. L. Rev.  694 1990
ANALYZING STOCK LOCK-UPS
D. Who Wins the Takeover Auction after a Treasury Sale? ,
The question remains whether treasury sales foreclose third parties
from making competitive bids. The foregoing analysis indicates that a
third party ultimately will prevail only if its maximum bid is greater
than the initial bidder's maximum bid:
B3* > B1*.
But under what conditions will this hold? Substituting for B1 * and B3*
from equations (3) and (8) discloses that a third party will ultimately
prevail in a bidding war if and only if:
B3* = (NV + PT)/(N + T) > B1 * = (NV + PT)/(N + T),
which simplifies to:
(9) V3 > V1 .
The straightforward interpretation of equation (9) is that third-party
bidders will outbid the initial bidder holding treasury shares only if they
value the firm more. But this is exactly the condition for a third party
to prevail in takeover contests without sales of treasury stock. If a third
party has a higher reservation price before a treasury sale, it will have a
higher reservation price after the treasury sale. This striking result
means that the sale of treasury stock lowers the reservations price of all
bidders but does so equally. The "diluting" costs of treasury sales for
the third-party bidders is identical to the "opportunity" cost for the
initial bidder. The "diluting" cost to the third-party bidder is the initial
bidder's profit from losing the takeover. Counter to the arguments of
the plaintiffs in Van Gorkom then, the sale of treasury stock does not
need to foreclose higher-valuing bidders from outbidding the pur-
chaser of treasury shares. The primary effect of the ordinary treasury
sale on the ensuing auction contest, therefore, is not on who wins the
auction, but on what the winning bid will be. Consistent with basic ten-
ets of efficiency, the ownership of corporate assets- will travel to the
highest valuer, but the treasury sale reduces the per share bid that wins
the auction.
The following parts explore two caveats to this conclusion that
treasury sales will not affect the ordinal ranking of parties' reservation
prices. Part II argues that treasury sales may increase third-party reser-
vation prices by giving interested parties additional time to investigate
and finance a competitive bid. Part III then shows that unfaithful target
management might actually induce a treasury share recipient to bid
above its reservation price (as a condition for purchasing treasury
shares) and thereby cause foreclosure. The tension between these two
caveats will determine whether treasury sales are legitimate target
tactics.
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II. THE POSSIBILITY OF FACILITATING A TAKEOVER AUCTION: THE Ex
ANTE INCENTIVES FOR TREASURY SHARE SALES
The last Part analyzed the incentives of takeover bidders after a
treasury share sale. Given these foreseeable ex post incentives, this
part investigates whether it ever will be mutually advantageous ex ante
for a target to sell treasury shares to a bidder. In particular, by analyz-
ing the ex ante incentives for treasury share sales, we can directly assess
whether target shareholders might gain from the transaction. This lat-
ter analysis is central to whether the directors are acting as faithful
fiduciaries. 38
An important conclusion of this section is that treasury sales can
benefit shareholders. By persuading a bidder to hold its tender offer
open for a longer time period, a target management may generate
higher competing bids for the target stock. Timing is central to this
story. Less time inhibits the ability of third parties to investigate and
finance a competitive bid.3 9 Selling treasury shares to a bidder is a way
that a target company buys time from the bidder. Although the trea-
sury sale itself reduces the participants' reservation price for the target
stock, an auction with reduced reservation prices may produce a higher
bid for target shareholders than no auction at all.
But this additional time to create a takeover auction comes at a
price. To rigorously demonstrate that a treasury sale is in the target
shareholders' interest, it is necessary to show that the gains from the
auction outweigh the costs of the treasury sale. Bidders, such as (
Pritzker, will demand compensation before they will serve as "'stalking
horse[s]' for an 'auction contest.' ",40 A bidder will agree to hold a
tender offer open only if the expected profits from a takeover auction
with treasury shares exceeds the expected profits of proceeding with an
abbreviated tender offer without treasury shares. If bidders demand
too much compensation, then target shareholders will not, on net, gain
from "buying" a takeover auction. It is necessary, therefore, to show
that the bidders will demand less than the shareholders are willing to
offer. In short, it is necessary to show that there can be "gains from
trade" in entering into a treasury share sale.
Treasury sales can create mutual gains if they increase the
38. Often, to evaluate the fidelity of target management, courts need to distinguish
between actions aimed at keeping the incumbent target management in power (the man-
agement entrenchment hypothesis) and actions aimed at increasing shareholder wealth
(wealth maximization hypothesis). See Macey & McChesney, supra note 12, at 42-43.
39. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1174, 1178-79 (1981); Haddock,
Macey & McChensey, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va.
L. Rev. 701 (1987); Macey & McChesney, supra note 12, at 27 & n.58.
40. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866. Even when lock-up agreements do not explicitly
compel a bidder to hold its tender offer open, treasury sales can facilitate takeover auc-
tions by eliciting an initial bid which puts the target "in play."
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probability that third-party bidders will be found who value the target
more than the treasury share recipient (V3 > V1). Without treasury
shares, the initial bidder gains nothing from the entry of third parties
into the auction contest. But after entering into a treasury sale agree-
ment, both the initial bidder and the target shareholders can potentially
gain from a third-party bid that is greater than the initial bidder's
valuation.
This point can be illustrated with a simple example based; once
again, on the Trans Union takeover. Without a treasury share agree-
ment, Pritzker and the Trans Union management might have expected
that Pritzker had a 50 percent chance of taking over Trans Union at his
initial bid of $55 per share, and a 50 percent chance of taking over the
firm at $60 per share (because intervening third-party bids would force
him to raise his initial offer). The additional time created by a treasury
share agreement, however, might have caused the parties to expect a 50
percent chance that a $65 third-party bidder could be found (and again
a 50 percent chance that Pritzker would take over Trans Union at $55).
Under these expectations, both Pritzker and the Trans Union share-
holders are made better off by entering into the treasury share agree-
ment. Without treasury shares Pritzker would expect to earn only
$32.5 million from the takeover (.5(60 - 55)13 million), because he
would only profit if he could take over Trans Union at a price less than
his $60 valuation. With treasury shares, however, Pritzker profits
whether or not he wins the auction: Pritzker's total expected profits
increase to $46 million.4 1 The shareholders of Trans Union also gain
from entering into the treasury share agreement. Without the agree-
ment, the expected winning bid would be $57.5 per share (an average
of the possible $55 and $60 bids), but with the agreement they would
expect to tender at $60 (the average of $55 and $65).42
The initial bidder's bargaining power in the foregoing analysis has
been premised on its ability to quickly consummate a takeover if the
41. With treasury shares, Pritzker would again have a 50% chance to take over the
firm at $55 per share and a 50%o chance to tender his treasury shares to a third party
bidding $65 per share. His total expected profits with treasury shares accordingly is:
.5(60 - 55)13 million + .5(65 - 38)1 million
32.5 million + 13.5 million
= $46 million.
42. This analysis assumes that the initial bidder cannot costlessly resell the target
firm to a higher bidder. If the initial bidder could costlessly resell the target, the poten-
tial existence of higher-valuing third-party bidders would increase V, because the initial
bidder would include in its valuation the potential profits from resale. Both empirical
and theoretical reasons exist, however, for expecting that the transaction costs of resale
will not eliminate all gains from treasury share trade. See Gilson, Seeking Competitive
Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 62-64 (1982);
Macey & McChesney, supra note 12, at 26 n.52. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Auc-
tions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982) (arguing that transac-
tion costs of successive tenders are lower than the costs of auction).
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target fails to buy extra time. In some situations, however, this bargain-
ing power may be severely limited. For example, if the target corpora-
tion has an effective poison pill agreement in place,43 it need not
bargain for extra time (because the initial bidder will not want to con-
summate its offer until the management has rescinded the pill). Never-
theless, treasury sales can benefit target shareholders. Potential
bidders may need to incur sunk costs to investigate the value of the
target. These sunk costs may be lost if a third party wins the firm in a
bidding contest.44 Treasury sales can compensate bidders for making
this investment in information and more efficiently divide the risks and
returns in making such investments. 45
The possibility that treasury sales will generate gains from trade is
heightened by the endogenous nature of these probabilities. The ac-
tions of both the target and the initial bidder can crucially affect the
likelihood that higher-valuing third-party bidders will come forward. A
treasury share agreement can invest both the target and the initial bid-
der in "producing" such higher-valuing bidders. A properly structured
treasury share agreement will turn the initial bidder into a selling agent
of the target shareholders. With the profits from treasury shares as a
sales commission, the Pritzkers of the world may, paradoxically, even
attempt to locate third-party bidders to outbid them.46
43. The term "poison pill" describes a range of defensive takeover tactics in which
the target management commits to granting common shareholders preferred stock or
discounted warrants if a tender offeror succeeds in acquiring a majority of the outstand-
ing shares. See R. Clark, supra note 3, at 574-75. The tactic is "poisonous" to the
offeror because a successful tender offer triggers massive dilution of corporate value.
44. The probability that a third party will win the auction, and that the initial bidder
will lose its sunk costs of investigation, is especially great if free riding is possible. See
infra note 83.
45. A target also might induce bidder investment by promising a quick transaction
(a short offer period) that maximizes the probability that the acquirer can take over the
firm at B11, the initial offer price. Quick transactions, however, deny both the target
shareholders and the bidder the additional potential gains of selling to a higher-valuing
third party. In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court's holding in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (target directors
must try to obtain the highest price possible for the company once they determine that a
takeover is "inevitable") would appear to forbid such quick transactions. I would like to
thank Reinier Kraakman for bringing these points to my attention. •
46. Different probability assessments and different attitudes toward risk also can
create gains from entering into treasury share agreements. For example, if the target
managers believe more strongly than the initial bidder that additional time will generate
high additional offers, then the parties will more likely be able to negotiate a treasury
share agreement to extend the time for additional offers (because the target managers
will believe that they can compensate the initial bidder for its additional costs, plus a
substantial profit, and still expect to gain from the treasury sale). In addition, if the
initial bidder is more risk averse than the diversified target shareholders, both sides may
realize gains from the sale of "auction insurance" to the initial bidder. See supra text p.
690 (analogizing treasury sale as insurance).
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III. THE POSSIBILITY OF FORECLOSURE: STANDARDS
FOR ANALYZING LOCK-UPS
The foregoing analysis does not suggest that treasury share sales
necessarily increase the welfare of target shareholders. 4 7 If targets
overcompensate the treasury share recipient either by selling too many
treasury shares or by setting too low a striking price, then the share-
holders can be hurt. Although target managers might enter into trea-
sury share agreements to further their shareholders' interests, it also is
possible that target managers will sell treasury shares solely to promote
their own interests in retaining their jobs. If the target managers are
unfaithful agents, they may choose to sell treasury shares to a bidder
who implicitly promises to retain their services.
Courts need to establish standards that distinguish between faith-
ful managers attempting to facilitate a more lucrative auction for their
firm and unfaithful managers attempting to foreclose an auction by sell-
ing their firm to a bidder who will retain their services. The faithful
manager's motive is to maximize shareholder wealth, while the motive
of the unfaithful agent is to entrench target management. To distin-
guish between these competing hypotheses, this Part examines extreme
forms of treasury sales that can foreclose higher-valuing bidders from a
takeover auction. It then proposes a standard to distinguish treasury
sales that facilitate takeover auctions from those that foreclose them.
A. The Foreclosing Effect of Overinsurance: The Treasury Give Away
Part II showed that treasury share purchases can be a form of auc-
tion insurance for bidders in that they would be guaranteed some prof-
its even if they ultimately lost the ensuing bidding contest.4 8 If the
treasury shares insure more than 100% of this takeover risk, however,
47. Returning to our earlier example, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, if
the treasury sale created only a 10 percent chance that a $65 third-party bidder would be
found, Pritzker would still benefit from the sale:
0.9(60 - 55)13 million + 0.1(65 - 38)1 million
58.5 million + 2.7 million
$61.2 million;
but the Trans Union shareholders would be injured: Without the agreement, the ex-
pected winning bid would be $57.5 per share (an average of the possible $55 and $60
bids), but with the agreement the shareholders would expect to tender for $56 (0.9 X
$55 + 0.1 x $65).
48. The Delaware chancery court alternatively characterized the insurance aspects
of the treasury sale:
[fln the event of a higher bid being made for the stock of Trans Union, the
Pritzkers would be compensated [by the treasury shares] to some extent by hav-
ing issued what amounted to a 'put' to Trans Union, in that during the 90 to
120 days required to gain approval of the proposed merger, the Pritzkers
would be contractually obligated to consummate the proposed merger, while
Trans Union would remain free to accept a better offer.
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foreclosure of third-party bidders is possible. Higher-valuing bidders
may be foreclosed if the target company guarantees that the recipient
of treasury shares will profit more from losing the auction (and tender-
ing its shares) than from winning the auction at its initial bid.
The possibility of foreclosure is depicted in Figure 3. In this
graphed example, the treasury share agreement is so large that the ini-
tial bid, B l', is larger than the bidder's reservation price, Bl*.4 9 The
initial bidder's profits from losing a takeover contest and tendering
treasury shares grows as either the number of treasury shares (T) in-
creases or as the recipient's purchase price (P) decreases. Accordingly,
the size of a treasury share agreement increases if either T rises or P
falls. 50 In Figure 3, as the size of the agreement increases the treasury
share profit line shifts upward. If the treasury sale involves either a
large enough block of shares or a low-enough striking price, then the
treasury share profit line begins to intersect the takeover profit line to
the left of the initial bid.
As argued above,5' treasury purchases reduce the recipient's reser-
vation price. If the treasury share agreement is so extreme that the
recipient's reservation price is reduced below its initial offer (B1' >
B,*), then higher-valuing third parties may be foreclosed. Extreme
forms of treasury sales cause the bidder purchasing treasury shares to
root for rivals to outbid its initial offer. As depicted in Figure 3, when
Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL 8774, 14-15 (Del. Oh. July 6, 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
49. Overinsuring treasury sales can be negotiated through two analytically distinct
scenarios. Under one scenario, a bidder proposes an initial bid and the target proposes
a treasury sale to buy "time" to hold a takeover auction. This scenario parallels the facts
of Van Gorkom, see Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866-68. Overinsurance results from this
process if, given the initial offer, the treasury sale unduly reduces the bidder's reservation
price.
Under an alternative scenario, however, the target management conditions the trea-
sury sale upon receiving a higher initial bid. Overinsurance results from this process if
the induced higher initial bid is greater than the bidder's reservation price. While both
types of negotiation foreclose higher-valuing bidders, treasury sales that induce higher
initial bids might benefit target shareholders and thus rebut allegations of fiduciary
breach. See infra note 72.
While these processes for negotiating treasury sales are analytically distinct, they
may be difficult to distinguish in practice. In some situations, target management may
sell treasury shares to buy both "time" and "a higher initial bid." Moreover, if courts
subject treasury sales that induce higher bids to less scrutiny, then both bidders and
targets may enter into sham negotiations. For example, in anticipation of litigation,
Pritzker might offer an unfaithful Trans Union management a sham initial bid at a low,
nonforeclosing price, say $40, followed by negotiations resulting in a higher initial bid
of $55 nominally made in exchange for the treasury share option.
Because of these difficulties, courts should initially focus on the degree, rather than
the form, of foreclosure. As argued below, see infra note 72, plaintiffs should at least be
able to establish a prima facie case of target mismanagement by evidence of
overinsurance.
50. See supra text accompanying note 16.
51. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
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B/ is to the right of B,*, there is a discontinuity at the initial bid price,
B,', between the profits from winning and losing a takeover auction. If
a third-party bidder matches the initial bid, the recipient of treasury
shares would gain more by tendering its shares than by completing its
own tender offer. A bidder purchasing the treasury shares under these
conditions would not be willing to match a competing bid that was even
slightly higher than the initial bid. Indeed, if it could retain its treasury
shares, it would prefer to lower its outstanding offer and invite rivals to
outbid it.
The earlier analysis showed that initial and third-party bidders
would have identical costs in raising their bids, because the "opportu-
nity" cost of treasury sales for initial bidders was identical to the "dilut-
ing" cost for third-party bidders.52 But when target companies insure
more than 100% of an initial bidder's takeover risk, foreclosure stems
from the unwillingness of third parties to match the initial offer. As
before, the bidders with identical valuations (V and V3) will have identi-
cal incentives to raise a given bid. But the target corporation can con-
dition the sale of treasury shares on higher initial bids: the target can
use the guarantee of treasury profits to induce the initial bidder to
make a higher initial tender offer.53
52. See supra pp. 694-95.
53. From Figure 3, we know that given the treasury sale, the initial bidder would
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It is possible to show algebraically that third parties may be fore-
closed from bidding when the initial offer is above a bidder's reserva-
tion price. From equation (8), we know that a third party's maximum
bid after a treasury sale equals:
B3* = (NV3 + PT)/(N + T).
A third party will be able to enter a competing bid only if its maximum
bid, B*, is greater than or equal to the treasury share recipient's initial
bid, B,' (B3* > B,1). Setting B3* equal to the initial bid B/ and solving
for V3, we can derive V3, ", the minimum valuation that third-party bid-
ders must have to match the initial bid (after the effects of treasury
share diluting):
B/ = (NV, + PT)/(N + T).
(10) Vpm' = [B,'(N + T) - PT]/N.
By substituting for B,* from equation (3),54 this equation can be simpli-
fied to:
(11) V3mn = V, + (B/ - B,*)(N + T)/N.
The minimum valuation that a third party must have to match the initial
bid will exceed V, by a discreet amount whenever B/ > B,*. By in-
creasing the amount of overinsurance, a target can arbitrarily set the
amount by which the initial bid exceeds the initial bidder's reservation
price (B-' - B,*). Accordingly, overinsurance can arbitrarily increase
the minimum valuations for third party matching bids (V.3i " ) above the
initial bidder's valuation (Vi).
Equation (11) shows how overinsurance can foreclose higher-valu-
ing third-party bidders: With a treasury sale that overinsures (so that
B/ > B,*), some third parties who valued the firm more than the initial
bidder nonetheless will fail to match the initial bid (Vjmif > V3 > VI).
like to lower its opening bid. However, because the treasury sale is conditioned upon
this initial high bid, the initial bidder is not asked whether it would still like to match its
initial bid; only third parties have the choice, given the treasury sale, of whether or not
to match. Overinsurance thus forecloses third-party participation in the auction from
the outset by discouraging them from matching the initial bids of treasury share recipi-
ents. An implication of this analysis is that treasury sale agreements that do not discour-
age competing offers probably insure less than 100% of the initial takeover risk and
accordingly are nonforeclosing: One matching third-party bid powerfully refutes the
notion of foreclosure.
54. Adding and subtracting B1 to the right-hand side of equation (10) yields:
Vi"" = [[B,' - B,* + B,*1(N + T) - PT]/N.
= [f(B/' - B,*) + B,*J(N + T) - PT]/N
- [I(B/ - B,*)(N + T)]I/N + [B,*(N + T) - PT]/N.
Substituting the equivalent expression for B, from equation (3) yields:
= [(B-' - B,*)(N + T)]/N + [I(VIN + PT)/(N + T)j(N + T) - PT]/N
= [(B-' B,*)(N + T)I/N + V1.
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Equation (9) algebraically represents the intuition that treasury sales do
not foreclose if the higher-valuing third-party bidders prevail (V3 > VI).
Equation (11), however, demonstrates that when treasury shares over-
insure, a range of higher-valuing third parties will lack an incentive to
match the initial bid.
The treasury share agreement in Figure 3 provides more than
100% profit insurance for the initial bid. Rational bidders and faithful
management would not contract for this much insurance. Given the
treasury sale, the bidder would prefer to reduce its initial bid to B1*.5 5
Faithful target management, negotiating for additional auction time,
would not need to guarantee a bidder more than its expected profits
from winning a takeover. Overinsuring a bidder's takeover risk, there-
fore, can be seen as a "give away" by the target management: Faithful
managers should be able to buy the extra time needed to create an
auction for a smaller price. Target management should be able to elicit
a "stalking horse" offer for fewer treasury shares sold at a higher price.
B. Voting Foreclosure as Red Herring
Some courts have suggested that treasury sales also can create a
form of "voting lock-up" if the treasury shares, by themselves, signifi-
cantly affect the recipient's chance of obtaining voting control of the
target corporation. 56 For example, if Trans Union's management had
sold Pritzker 13 million treasury shares, Pritzker would have had a ma-
jority voting interest without even tendering for additional shares.
Such an extreme treasury sale would guarantee the recipient the option
of taking over the target because voting control would be afait accompli.
It is difficult to demonstrate, however, why such voting lock-up
would increase the foreclosing effect of overinsurance. If there is no
foreclosure, obtaining a voting majority should not affect a bidder's be-
havior. For example, if Trans Union sold Pritzker 13 million treasury
shares at $60 per share, there would be no overinsurance foreclosure,5 7
55. A rational bidder would prefer to bid B1* because it would realize a higher
profit regardless of whether it won the auction at that price or tendered its treasury
shares to a higher-valuing third-party bidder. Graphically, this is shown in Figure 3 be-
cause the equilibrium profit line with B/' = B,* is everywhere greater than or equal to
the equilibrium profit line with B/ > B,*.
56. In reviewing the Pritzker/Trans Union treasury sale agreement, the Delaware
chancery court concluded that the transaction "did not affect the vote of the stockhold-
ers which approved such merger, or stand in the way of possible bids by other interested
parties." Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL 8774, 23 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982), rev'd
sub nom. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). This conclusion explicitly
delineates voting and bidding foreclosure.
57. Purchasing the treasury shares at $60 per share (Pritzker's own valuation of the
target, V, = $60) ensures that there is no overinsurance because Pritzker will profit
more from winning the takeover than from tendering his treasury shares to a matching
bid. Purchasing the treasury shares at $60 per share ensures that there is no "diluting"
effect of the synergistic value.
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but Pritzker would have voting control of Trans Union and therefore
would be able to force a takeover. Yet Pritzker would have no reason to
block third-parties that made higher bids from taking over the firm be-
cause he then could tender his treasury shares to these third parties at a
price greater than their value to him.58 As long as higher-valuing third
parties have higher reservation prices, the percentage of outstanding
shares that a treasury share recipient controls, by itself, should not have
a foreclosing effect. In assessing the foreclosing effects of treasury
share agreements, courts should restrict their attention accordingly to
instances of overinsurance. 59
C. A Proposed Legal Standard for Adjudicating the Validity of Treasury Share
Agreements
When treasury sales provide extreme forms of overinsurance,
courts should reach the conclusion that the primary purpose of the sale
was to foreclose third-party bidders, and thus that the target manage-
ment has breached its fiduciary duties to its shareholders. In the ex-
treme, courts should invalidate agreements in which they determine
that the treasury shares provide more than 100% insurance. 60 To ap-
ply this standard, courts need to consider whether the treasury share
recipient would profit more from tendering its treasury shares to a hy-
pothetical bid that matched the initial offer than from a takeover at the
initial offer. It is a straightforward matter to calculate the profits of
tendering the treasury shares [(B,1 - P)T]. The court then should as-
sess whether the treasury share recipient could have hoped to earn
more from the takeover. Because the profits from winning the takeover
[(V1 - B/)N] are necessarily a function of the bidder's valuation,
courts would need to estimate the initial bidder's per share valuation.
Courts of course cannot do this with precision. However, the more that
the treasury sale foreclose potential rivals, the more inflated will be the
58. This again assumes, see supra note 42, that Pritzker cannot costlessly resell the
target to a higher-valuing third party. If such resale were possible, Pritzker might prefer
to block the third-party bid and force a back-end merger so that he could profit from
reselling minority shares at a higher price.
59. To the extent that "voting lock-up" remains a judicial concern, courts should
prefer agreements with larger discounts but fewer shares. Since the amount of takeover
insurance is a function of the number of treasury shares and their price, see supra note
16 and accompanying text, target management can offer equivalent amounts of takeover
insurance by lowering either the number or price of treasury shares. For example, 10
million shares at $38 per share provides the same amount of initial bid insurance [($55
- $38) 10 million = $170 million] as 5 million treasury shares at $21 per share [($55 -
$21) 5 million = $170 million]. The latter agreement is less likely to cause "voting lock-
up" because the treasury share recipient acquires a smaller percentage of the target's
outstanding shares.
60. Judicial invalidations could take the form of 1) enjoining the planned treasury
sales, 2) ordering rescission of executed sales, or 3) holding target management liable
for breaches of its fiduciary duty. The proper scope of a judicial remedy would turn
primarily on whether the treasury sale or merger was completed.
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requisite bidder valuation. In extreme cases, a court should be able to
confidently determine that foreclosure has resulted because the requi-
site bidder valuation will be beyond the reasonable range of possible
valuations.
For example, returning to the facts of the Trans Union takeover,
the court should have asked itself whether Pritzker would have ten-
dered his treasury shares to a rival who matched his initial bid. It is
easy to calculate that Pritzker's profits from tendering to the rival would
have been $17 million [(B! - P)T]. The court then should have as-
sessed whether Pritzker conceivably could have profited as much from
taking over Trans Union at his initial bid. From equation (1), the prof-
its from winning a takeover are:
(VI1 - B1)N.
For these profits to be greater than $17 million implies that Pritzker's
per share valuation was:
(V1 - $55) 13 million $17 million
V1 > $56.30.
Under this analysis, the Trans Union treasury sale seems to have
been well within reason.61 It does not stretch the imagination to con-
ceive that Pritzker valued the firm this much. Trans Union itself esti-
mated the share value to be between $55 and $65.62 Without more, a
court should not enjoin the Pritzker treasury sale for having a foreclos-
ing or lockup effect.63
61. The Delaware chancery court reached this same conclusion for different rea-
sons. Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL 8774, 6-7 (Del. Ch. July 6, 1982), rev'd sub
nom. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). The chancellor summarily dis-
missed the lock-up allegation:
[The] transaction, I believe, did not affect the vote of the stockholders which
approved such merger, or stand in the way of possible bids by other interested
parties. Thus, while a competing bidder would be required to pay $17 million
more than the Pritzker's offer to equal such offer ($55 less $38 times one mil-
lion shares equals $17 million), this is a modest amount in the context of a $690
million transaction. And while plaintiffs rely on Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,
[669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981)] a case which was involved with offers for tenders
of stock of Marathon Oil Co. in a case involving competing bids by Mobil and
others in which the United States Steel Co. had acquired an option to purchase
10,000,000 authorized but unissued shares of Marathon for $90.00 a share at a
time when there were 58,685,906 Marathon common shares outstanding, the
Court stated: "In our opinion, the stock option was large enough in this take-
over contest to serve as an artificial and significant deterrent to competitive
bidding for a controlling block of Marathon shares." I do not for the reasons
stated believe that such case is controlling here.
Id.
62. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 867 (Del. 1985) (Trans Union's chief fi-
nancial officer's estimate of firm's value for purposes of a leveraged buyout).
63. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to base its decision to impose
liability on the Trans Union directors upon the ancillary aspects of the treasury agree-
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Yet, the foregoing analysis also indicates that the "foreclosure" or
"overinsurance" standard articulated above will give target manage-
ment a large amount of discretion to issue treasury shares to bidders.
For example, if Trans Union had sold not 1 but 10 million treasury
shares, Pritzker would need to value the firm at a minimum of $68 per
share to make the takeover profits larger than the profits from tender-
ing.64 It is possible, however, that selling Pritzker even 10 times the
number of treasury shares would not have caused foreclosure. 65 A nat-
ural question, then, is whether less extreme forms of treasury sales
should be invalidated even if they do not cause foreclosure, i.e., even if
they do not foreclose higher-valuing third parties from taking over the
target. The hard question is whether courts should invalidate agree-
ments in which treasury shares provide less than 100%o auction
insurance.
To answer this question, we must first remember that even in the
absence of foreclosure, target shareholders may still be injured by trea-
sury sales. The profitability for target shareholders turns, inter alia, on
the degree to which treasury shares induce higher competitive offers.66
If higher bids are not anticipated, then even treasury sales that do not
cause foreclosure may precipitate an auction with a lower winning bid.
A treasury sale will affect third-party bids both through an "auction-
creation effect" and through a "diluting effect." The former increases
the likelihood of third-party bids being made, but the latter lowers the
maximum amount that third parties will bid. Even a nonforeclosing
treasury sale will harm target shareholders if the diluting effect exceeds
the effect of creating an auction.
Consequently, courts might go beyond the prohibition of foreclo-
sure to set aside treasury sales that are not cost justified. Under this
standard, courts would assess whether the target's auction-insurance
cost was proportional to the benefits of auction creation. Indeed, the
Delaware chancery court recently adopted a similar standard. The
court held that "[i]t is not necessarily inconsistent ... for directors to
ment, such as the no-shop clause, rather than on the amount of overinsurance involved.
See id. at 878-85.
64. If Pritzker had bought 10 million treasury shares (T = 10 million), then for the
takeover profits to be greater than the tendering profits:
[(B,' - P)T] < (VI - B/) N
[($55 - $38) 10 million] < (VI - $55) 13 million
$170 million < (VI) 13 million - $715 million
$885 million < (V) 13 million
V1 > $68.08.
65. Under the analysis presented in the previous section, see supra notes 48-55 and
accompanying text, a court should determine that such an agreement caused foreclosure
if it found that Pritzker valued Trans Union at less than $68 per share.
66. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of fa-
cilitating an auction through the sale of treasury shares).
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grant lock-up options (for stock or assets) or agree to no-shop
clauses.... Where there are competing bidders, and the company's
directors do not treat all of the bidders equally, 'the board's action
must be reasonable in relation to the advantage sought to be achieved.' "67
Although the Delaware courts have applied a similar "proportionality"
standard to defensive tactics that might entrench incumbent target
management, 68 this standard is less appropriate for analyzing the ef-
fects of stock lock-ups. Target managers do not have a conflict of inter-
est in making such imprudent, but nonforeclosing, treasury agreements
because such agreements will not prevent a higher-valuing third party
from outbidding the treasury share recipient.6 9 If higher-valuing third
parties are not foreclosed from the auction, imprudent treasury sales
will only affect the size of the winning bid, not the winner's identity.
Imprudent, but nonforeclosing, treasury agreements accordingly are
poor methods for entrenching incumbent target managers. 70 The ab-
sence of this competing managerial interest militates in favor of the less
stringent scrutiny that is generally applied to managerial decisions-the
business judgment rule.7 1 Thus, courts should enjoin only treasury
sales that insure more than 100%o of a bidder's takeover bid. The term
"lock-up" only is appropriate for the more extreme treasury sales
which foreclose competitive bids, because only these agreements truly
discourage higher-valuing bidders from raising the initial bidder's
ante.7
2
67. Rand v. Western Airlines, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,751, at
94,053 (Del. Ch. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988)). Indeed, it is arguable that Rand establishes an
even more stringent test of management fidelity. The opinion suggests: "'If the grant
of an auction-ending provision is appropriate, it must confer a substantial benefit upon the
stockholders in order to withstand exacting scrutiny by the courts.'... Only after satisfying
this standard will the directors' actions be accorded the protection of the business judg-
ment rule." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1284).
68. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (de-
fensive tactics must be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed" by a hostile offer);
Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. Law. 247, 252-60 (1989).
69. See supra pp. 694-95.
70. It may be that in an uncertain world even treasury sales that insure less than
100% of an initial bidder's risk will nevertheless dissuade third-party bids. Unfaithful
target managers, playing upon such uncertainty, might still have a conflict of interest in
negotiating the treasury sale. Even if a treasury sale is nonforeclosing, target manage-
ment should be held liable if it enters into such a sale (mistakenly) thinking that it will
foreclose rival bidders. Even though rivals are not foreclosed, target shareholders are
likely to be damaged by the treasury sale, because the resulting auctions will be won at a
lower bid.
71. The business judgement rule is "a presumption that in making a business deci-
sion the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See generally R. Clark, supra note 3, § 3.4 (dis-
cussing tensions between business judgment rule and duty of care).
72. As the earlier example indicated, an overinsurance or foreclosure standard
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Courts, however, might look to ancillary aspects of the treasury
sale in determining whether the sale is in the target stockholder's best
interest. Particularly, courts might examine any information restric-
tions placed on the target. If the treasury sale is negotiated in order to
create an auction for the target, then the treasury sale agreement
should allow the target to disclose the same information to third-party
bidders that has been disclosed to the initial bidder. This especially is
true because, as discussed above, 73 an important source of the mutual
gains from entering into such agreements comes from locating higher-
valuing third-party bidders. Indeed, if the treasury sale is driven by the
joint desire of the initial bidder and the target corporation to elicit a bid
greater than V1, then one would expect that the initial bidder itself
would become a ready and willing conduit of information about the
target to potential third-party bidders. A treasury share sale can turn
the treasury share purchaser into a sales agent of the target corpora-
tion. This suggests that the more serious charges leveled against the
Trans Union treasury agreement may have concerned the informa-
tional restrictions that could have undermined the ensuing auction.7 4
If target management is to defend its behavior by claiming it was bar-
gives target management great leeway in negotiating "large" treasury sales. See supra
notes 64-65 and accompanying text. It is possible, however, to say that courts should be
even more lenient. While overinsurance can be caused by "give aways" from an unfaith-
ful target management (such as an increase in the number of treasury shares or a de-
crease in their price), it is also possible that overinsurance stems from a faithful
management negotiating, inter alia, a higher initial bid. See supra note 49. For example,
if Trans Union had conditioned Pritzker's treasury sale on a requirement that Pritzker
begin the bidding at $59 per share, then under our earlier assumptions, see supra text
accompanying notes 25-26, the treasury sale would have a foreclosing effect (because
$59 = B/> B,* = $58.43). This suggests that a foreclosing treasury sale may be engi-
neered by either faithful or unfaithful management. Indeed, a perverse effect of an
overinsurance standard is that target management could protect itself from charges of
infidelity for any size treasury sale simply by negotiating a lower initial bid for its share-
holders.
While the liability implications of an overinsurance standard appear harsh when
management has elicited a higher initial bid, these higher bids come at the cost of fore-
closing even higher-valuing bidders. Given the great discretion that target management
enjoys under an overinsurance standard, at a minimum courts should shift the burden to
the target to justify the size of the treasury sale in relation to any enhanced negotiated
initial bid and anticipated higher bids. The target management could then rebut a pre-
sumption of fiduciary breach by showing either that the treasury sale was conditioned
upon a higher initial bid, or that they were not grossly negligent in believing that the
treasury sale was not foreclosing. Cf. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985) (issue of whether directors have breached their duty of care determined under
gross negligence standard (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984))).
73. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing increased probability
of finding higher-valuing bidders resulting from treasury share sale).
74. Van Gorkom conceded that "the Agreement barred Trans Union from actively
soliciting [competing] offers and from furnishing to interested parties any information
about the Company other than that already in the public domain." Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878 (Del. 1985).
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gaining to create an auction, the ancillary provisions of the agreement
should be consistent with such a motivation.75
D. Limiting the Target Corporation's Ability to "Contract Around" This
Standard: Single-Sided Immutability
This proposed legal standard represents a kind of single-sided im-
mutable rule. Corporate rules can be divided into two classes: one
class of rules are merely "defaults" which govern in the absence of a
countervailing charter or bylaw provision, while a second class of rules
are "immutable" and cannot be changed through corporate action.76
The proposed standard for scrutinizing treasury sales would be "single-
sided" in the sense that target corporations could enact bylaws or char-
ter provisions that further restricted the ability of their managers to
enter into these agreements, but target corporations would not be al-
lowed to execute corporate provisions which increased the ability of
target management to make overinsuring "lock-up" treasury sales.
Target corporations could, in a sense, contract around the proposed
default for more judicial scrutiny, but could not contract for less
scrutiny.
The rationale for this partial restriction of corporate freedom of
contract is that rational shareholders might wish to further restrict trea-
sury sales,77 but would not want to allow their managers to enter into
treasury stock agreements that would foreclose subsequent auctions.
Rational shareholders would not want to foreclose higher-valuing bid-
ders from an auction.
The immutable aspect of the rule is similar to the immutable re-
quirement of "good faith" in the law of contracts. Both the common
law and the Uniform Commercial Code impose an immutable obliga-
tion of good faith in the performance of every contract.78 Even if par-
ties enter into an agreement waiving one side's obligation of good faith,
courts will not enforce the provision. Because no rational person
would contract to let the other side act in bad faith, the courts assume
75. This analysis also suggests that the sale of treasury shares should estop target
management from arguing that a takeover auction is not in its shareholders' best inter-
ests. Under Delaware law, when a takeover becomes "inevitable," target management
has an affirmative obligation to obtain the highest possible bid. Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). The sale of treasury
shares to an active bidder should trigger this affirmative duty to conduct a takeover
auction.
76. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 10, at 87-95.
77. As stressed above, see supra note 66 and accompanying text, nonforeclosing
treasury sales still may injure target shareholders if the "diluting" effect is greater than
the "auction-creation" effect. Target shareholders seeking to induce initial bids, there-
fore, rationally may want to precommit themselves to a policy forbidding treasury sales.
78. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 & comment d (1981); U.C.C. § 1-
203 (1989). See generally E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17 & n.3 (1982) (discussing
sources and nature of good-faith requirement).
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that there could not have been true assent to such terms; there must
have been a failure in the process of contracting. Similarly, if courts
find corporate charter provisions of a target attempting to legitimate a
stock lock-up that rational target shareholders would not favor, then
courts should assume a failure of corporate governance-that target
management must not have faithfully pursued the objective of maximiz-
ing shareholder value.
Such single-sided immutable rules already exist in both the law of
contracts and corporations. For example, contracts law permits cove-
nants not to compete covering a reasonable period of time but prohib-
its covenants that extend beyond reasonable lengths. 79 Similarly,
corporations can contract with employees to go beyond the federal in-
sider trading prohibitions, but cannot contract to abrogate or reduce
the insider trading standard.80 Thus, while the "overinsurance" stan-
dard effectively grants target management great discretion in negotiat-
ing treasury sales, the management should not be able to. amend its
bylaws or articles of incorporation to "contract" for even more
discretion.
IV. ADDITIONAL APPLICATIONS
A. The Greenmail Alternative
The foregoing analysis of target treasury sales can also inform
courts' analysis of "greenmail." Greenmail is a defensive tactic in
which target management buys back, at a premium, shares acquired by
an initial bidder.8 ' Professors Jon Macey and Fred McChesney have
argued that "greenmail payments can actually improve the price share-
holders receive in tender 0ifers by facilitating an auction market for a
firm's stock."'82
Selling treasury shares to an initial bidder has virtually all the eco-
nomic attributes of greenmail. Like greenmail, a treasury sale to an
initial bidder eliminates the third-party bidder free-rider problem by
compensating the initial bidder for any informational investment.83
Like greenmail, a treasury sale does not waste real resources, but
79. See E. Farnsworth, supra note 78, § 5.3 & n.6.
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(1)(a) (1988). The statute does not, however, explicitly say
that private parties may not waive its provision. SeeJordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815
F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.) (dicta that even insider trading prohibi-
tions are merely default rules which corporate employment contracts could negate).
81. See R. Clark, supra note 3, § 13.6, at 574.
82. Macey & McChesney, supra note 12, at 15.
83. If third parties are able to reduce their costs of participating in an auction be-
cause of the investigative investments previously made by the first party, the third-party
bidders are "free riding" on the initial bidder's investments. See R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law § 3.7, at 55 (3d ed. 1986) (defining "free riding"). If the initial bidder is
not compensated for its initial investment, it will be less likely to undertake this invest-
ment because of the enhanced probability that free-riding bidders will win the auction.
Macey and McChesney point out that greenmail, unlike other defensive tactics, "actually
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merely represents a transfer from the target to the initial bidder.8 4 Like
greenmail, a treasury sale lowers the reservation price of subsequent
third-party bidders, but allows such bidders more time to formulate
and finance their bid. In sum, a treasury sale, like a greenmail
purchase, can facilitate a takeover auction for a target corporation.
And, as Macey and McChesney stress, treasury sales can create an auc-
tion without reducing the initial bidder's ex ante incentives to seek out
value enhancing information.
Greenmail purchases differ from treasury share sales, however, in
one important way. Greenmail (and standstill) agreements remove the
initial bidder from the subsequent auction. Under treasury sale agree-
ments, if no competitive bids are forthcoming, the target shareholders
will still reap the benefits of the initial bid (B/ - P). Under greenmail
purchase agreements, however, the target shareholders gain nothing if
subsequent bidders do not appear. Indeed, because the initial bidder is
bought off with the greenmail premium, the per share value of the re-
maining outstanding shares should, as a theoretical matter, decrease.
Empirical studies dramatically illustrate how target companies' stock
prices are decimated when defensive tactics preclude a takeover.8 5 Be-
cause a sale of treasury shares accomplishes everything that greenmail
does and also increases the probability that target shareholders will ulti-
mately receive a tender offer premium, treasury sales dominate green-
mail from a shareholder wealth maximization perspective. The very
availability of treasury sales strongly suggests that greenmail is used not
to benefit shareholders but to entrench management. Buying back
greenmail shares instead of selling treasury shares thus borders on
prima facie evidence of target management malefide.8 6 The possibility
solves the free-rider problem" because the initial bidder is paid "at least the expected
value to her of the minority takeover." Macey & McChesney, supra note 12, at 30.
84. In the case of a treasury sale, the transfer is contingent on the initial bidder's
losing the subsequent takeover auction. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The
amount of the transfer is equal to the losing bidder's profits from the treasury shares, (B1
- P)T. See supra p. 687 (equation (2)) & pp. 694-95.
Other defensive tactics, like the "scorched earth" technique in which the target
threatens, inter alia, to dissipate key assets may consume real resources. See Gurwin,
The Scorched Earth Policy, Institutional Investor, June 1979, at 32, 35.
85. See Easterbrook &Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 277, 281-91 (1984); see also Ryngaert, The Effect of Poison Pill Securi-
ties on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 377, 386-408 (1988) (finding that poison
pills decrease shareholder wealth). See generally R. Gilson & R. Kraakman, The Law
and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 133-38 (Supp. 1989) (analyzing studies of
poison pill plans).
86. Macey and McChesney point to the fact that in empirical studies of greenmail,
for "447o of the repurchasing firms, the payment of greenmail was associated with a
positive change in shareholder returns." Macey & McChesney, supra note 12, at 47. This
447o figure gives support to their argument that in some instances greenmail benefits
shareholders. However, there are other reasons that might explain this 44%o figure. If
the market was already expecting a greenmail payment, in some proportion of the cases
the actual payment would be less than the market expectation. Market reaction, there-
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of target treasury sales undermines the rationale for target treasury
purchases.
B. Treasury Sales to White Knights: The Possibility of Efficient Resistance
In a number of takeover contests, target management has sold
treasury shares not to the initial bidder (as in the Trans Union contest),
but to a subsequent third-party bidder.87 The sale of treasury shares to
these white knights (friendly third-party bidders) raises different policy
questions for lawmakers regulating the takeover arena. Most impor-
tantly, the sale of treasury stock to subsequent bidders promotes free
riding on the investments of the initial bidders. White knight treasury
sales guarantee the subsequent bidder a profit from the ensuing take-
over contest at the expense of the initial bidder's profits. Because white
knight treasury sales reduce the incentives of initial bidders to under-
take investigations that may produce socially valuable information,
some academics argue that courts should prohibit this form of target
resistance. For example, Frank Easterbrook and Dan Fischel have ar-
gued that courts should enjoin managerial resistance to tender offers
because resistance by targets reduces the initial bidder's incentives to
search for profitable takeover targets.88
The possibility of such ex post free riding, however, can still be ex
ante efficient. As David Haddock, Jon Macey, and Fred McChesney
have shown, allowing target resistance can promote value-creating in-
vestments by prospective targets which might overcome the free-riding
effect on initial bidders.8 9 Prospective targets, as well as prospective
bidders, have incentives to find the perfect match in a merger. Wealth-
maximizing merger law should seek to engender efficient investments
in search by the efficient searchers. Their arguments have particular
force with regard to treasury share resistance.
Prohibiting white knight treasury shares would significantly under-
mine the incentives of target managers to seek out higher-valuing third
parties-for the simple reason that target shareholders would receive a
lower return from such search expenditures.9" Treasury sales to white
knights also might be necessary to induce value-creating investments by
fore, would be positive because the management waste was not as bad as was expected.
See Black, supra note 31, at 613-15.
87. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981);
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F.Supp. 892, 895 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
88. Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 Stan. L.
Rev. 1, 21 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1176-77 (1981).
89. Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to
Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701, 709-12 (1987).
90. In some instances, it will be cheaper for the target to search for bidders and
estimate the joint value of the corporations.
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the prospective third-party bidders.9 ' Third parties might not invest in
research and mount a tender offer without some guaranteed return on
their investment. Thus, the use of treasury sales can help induce the
entry of competitive bidders into the takeover auction thereby benefit-
ing target shareholders by pushing the bidders toward their reservation
prices.
Finally, the possibility of selling treasury shares to third-party bid-
ders can create an ancillary competition for a separate product: time.
Treasury share agreements in large part can work to create a takeover
auction by buying additional time for interested third parties to investi-
gate, finance and enter competing bids. The target has an interest in
buying this time at least cost. If treasury sales to third parties are pro-
hibited, the initial bidder will have an enhanced monopoly in selling
this valuable commodity to the target. Under the Williams Act, how-
ever, third parties can extend the time of a takeover contest by entering
a competing offer.92 Promoting competition among bidders to extend
the tender offer period affords target managers time to create an auc-
tion for their firm at least cost.
Thus, although the possibility of white knight treasury sales
reduces the probability of an initial bid, it can increase the returns to
target shareholders once the bid has been made. From an ex ante per-
spective, target shareholders may gain by retaining the ability to enter
into such agreements. Moreover, as long as the treasury sale does not
foreclose higher-valuing bidders, management entrenchment is not
likely to taint the target's motivation. As long as the treasury sale facili-
tates an auction for the target, the target management is, at worst, im-
prudent in entering such agreements. Therefore, courts should also
enforce treasury sales to white knights under the business judgment
rule unless such sales represent a foreclosing overinsurance of the trea-
sury share recipient.
C. Asset Lock-ups
Although this Article has focused on the effects of stock lock-ups,
its analysis can be applied more broadly to asset lock-ups. For exam-
ple, in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,93 U.S. Steel and Marathon Oil
conditioned their merger agreement upon Marathon's giving U.S. Steel
"an option to purchase Marathon's 48% interest in oil and mineral
rights in the Yates Field for $2.8 billion."'94 If an asset of the target
91. White knight treasury sales give target management a credible way of communi-
cating to prospective third parties that this is a potentially profitable merger.
92. Regulations promulgated under the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e)
(1988), extend the period of a tender offer if a bidder increases its offer. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-l (b) (1989). A competing offer that forces an initial bidder to raise its bid can
thus create extra time for a takeover auction to evolve.
93. 669 F.2d 366, 367 (6th Cir. 1981).
94. Id. The merger agreement was also conditioned on Marathon's granting U.S.
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corporation is optioned to a bidder at a discount, then the asset recipi-
ent will have incentives which are analogous to a treasury share recipi-
ent. The asset-option recipient will be guaranteed a profit from losing
the takeover which will represent an opportunity cost of taking over the
firm. The incentives of a bidder with an option to purchase a dis-
counted target asset are depicted in Figure 4.








Unlike the'treasury share recipient, the profits from losing the takeover
are independent of third-party bids. Therefore, while winning the take-
over auction entails the opportunity cost of profiting on the asset op-
tion, the size of the opportunity cost does not increase as third-party
bids increase. This is depicted in Figure 4 by the horizontal profit line
for losing the auction contest. As before, the asset option necessarily
lowers the recipient bidder's reservation price (from V, to B1* in Figure
4) and, as before, third-party foreclosure is possible if the option recipi-
Steel a stock lock-up, an irrevocable option to purchase ten million authorized but unis-
sued shares of Marathon common stock for $90 per share. See supra note 34, for dis-
cussion. The Sixth Circuit struck down the Yates Field option as an asset lock-up: "The
only effect of this option can be to deter Mobil and any other potential tender offerors
from competing with USS in an auction for control of Marathon." Id. at 375.
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ent can profit more from losing the takeover auction (and exercising
the asset option) than from completing the takeover at its initial bid.
CONCLUSION
The defensive tactic of selling treasury shares to a tender offeror
has earned the pejorative sobriquet of "stock lock-up." This Article has
shown, however, that for a broad range of treasury sales this terminol-
ogy is inappropriate. Treasury sales need not foreclose higher-valuing
bidders from taking over target corporations. Courts have focused on
how treasury sales make it more costly for third parties to bid for the
target, but have failed to appreciate how treasury shares affect the re-
cipient's bidding incentives. A bidder purchasing treasury stock bears
an opportunity cost in matching its rivals' bids. A bidder can only
profit from its treasury shares if it loses the auction and tenders to a
rival bidder. Selling a bidder treasury shares lowers the maximum
amount third parties will offer, but it also reduces the maximum
amount that the recipient of the treasury stock will offer. At some
point, the recipient will prefer the increasing profits of dropping out of
the auction to the decreasing profits of matching higher bids. Because
the reservation price of all bidders is equally reduced, treasury sales
need not foreclose third-party bidders.
Treasury sales may benefit target shareholders by expanding the
opportunities for third parties to participate in a takeover auction.
Although the sale of treasury stock reduces bidders' reservation price
for the target shares, an auction with reduced reservation prices may,
produce a higher tender offer for target shareholders than no auction
at all. Target management may faithfully further its shareholders' in-
terests by entering into such agreements.
This Article, however, has identified an extreme form of treasury
sale that can foreclose higher-valuing bidders. The recipients of trea-
sury stock receive a form of takeover insurance that guarantees them a
profit even if they lose the ensuing auction. If target management of-
fers to insure more than 100%o of this takeover risk, then courts should
invalidate the sale as a breach of the target managers' fiduciary duty. In
making this assessment, courts simply should ask whether the recipient
of the treasury shares could hope to profit as much from winning the
takeover as from losing (and tendering its treasury shares). Overinsur-
ance forecloses rival bidders and should be enjoined. This provides a
powerful and straight-forward standard for distinguishing between
treasury sales that foreclose rivals to entrench target management and
treasury sales that facilitate takeover auctions to maximize shareholder
value.
1990] 715
HeinOnline -- 90 Colum. L. Rev.  715 1990
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
APPENDIX-Two-TIERED OFFERS
The analysis of the Article can be applied to takeover contests with
competing two-tiered offers.' Understanding the impact of treasury
sales in the context of two-tiered offers is of practical importance be-
cause the bids in many takeover contests are structured in two tiers.2
Consider an initial and a third-party bidder that are considering making
two-tiered bids on a particular target. As before, let:
N = number of original outstanding target shares;
T = number of treasury shares sold to initial bidder; and
P = pre-tender stock price and price of treasury shares.
While the second tier bid is less than the first tier bid, the "ap-
praisal rights" of the target corporation minority shareholders con-
strain the second-tier price from falling below a certain level. For
simplicity, assume that the second-tier bid must be at least the pre-
tender offer stock price, P. 3 Profit-maximizing bidders will *always buy
the second half of the shares at the minimum price, P. Reducing the
second-tier price puts target shareholders in a prisoner's dilemma be-
cause they face the prospect of receiving the inferior second-tier price
for their stock if they fail to tender it as part of the first-tier offer.4 This
prisoner's dilemma powerfully encourages shareholders to tender their
shares, for fear of receiving the lower second-tier price. Rational target
shareholders would tender their shares to the two-tier bid with the
highest average or "blend" price.5
A treasury sale will affect both the size and price of the first-tier
bid. In the absence of a treasury sale, rational bidders will bid for just
slightly more than 50% of the target company shares, N/2, for the front
end or first tier of its bid. After a treasury sale of T shares to an initial
bidder, however, the amounts needed to gain a majority change. After
1. In a two-tiered offer, a bidder acquires a majority of the target shares at a pre-
mium price (the "front-end") and subsequently forces the minority shareholder to sell
their remaining shares at a lower price (the "back-end"). See Barron's Dictionary of
Finance and Investment Terms 449 (2d ed. 1987) (definition of two-tier bid).
2. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 377 (6th Cir. 1981).
3. This assumption accords with case law that minority shareholders are not as-
sured merger profits as part of a takeover. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 713-14 (Del. 1983) (estimates of future value based upon speculative projections
"relating to the completion of a merger" may not be included in the court's appraisal;
minority shareholders may realize only future value that is "susceptible of proof"); see
also Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 13.01(3), 13.30 (1985) (dissenting shareholders
entitled to receive "fair value" for their shares, defined as the pre-merger value of the
shares exclusive of any appreciation "in anticipation" of the merger).
4. Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale
L.J. 13, 20-21 (1985); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and
Takeovers, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 297, 337 (1974).
5. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 4, at 21. As discussed below, there may be
situations in which a bid with a higher first tier bid may have a lower blend price.
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the treasury sale there are N + T shares outstanding. The firm acquir-
ing T shares via the treasury sale only needs to acquire (N - T)/2
shares to gain a majority,6 while third-party bidders must bid for (N +
T)/2 target shares to gain control in a front end bid. Thus, a treasury
sale increases the number of front-end shares for which third parties
must bid, and reduces the number for which the treasury share pur-
chaser must bid. To summarize, the treasury share purchaser will at-
tempt to acquire the N + T target shares (after a treasury sale) in the
following manner:
Number of Shares Source Price
T treasury sale P
(N - T)/2 first tier B11
(N + T)/2 second tier B12 = P
where B 11 = the initial bidder's first-tier price, and
B12 = the initial bidder's second-tier price.
A third-party bidder will attempt to acquire the N + T target shares
(after a treasury sale) in the following manner:
Number of Shares Source Price
(N + T)/2 first tier B31
(N + T)/2 second tier B32 = P
where B3' = the third party's first tier price, and
B32 = the third party's second tier price.
The blend price for third party bids, B3, is simply the average of the
first and second-tier bids:
(1A) B3B =(B3' + B32)/2 = (B' + P)/2.
The blend price for the treasury share purchaser, B, , is a weighted
average, however, because fewer shares are purchased in the first tier
than in the second tier of the takeover:
(2A) B1 = B/[(N - T)/2] + B,2 [(N + T)/2]
= B,'[(N - T)/2] + P[(N + T)/2].
Because rational shareholders will tender their shares to the bidder
with the highest blend price, the treasury share purchaser will focus on
the costs and benefits of raising its blend price in response to a third-
party bid. The profits from winning a two-tiered takeover contest will
be
N(V, - B,1 );
the profits from losing a two-tiered takeover contest to a third-party
bidder are:
6. (N - T)/2 + T = (N + T)/2.
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T(BB - p).
These equations are analogous to equations (1A) and (2A) in the text
except that the relevant choice variable is now the blend price instead
of the unitary or single-tier price of the previous analysis. As before in
equation (3), the two expressions can be equated to derive the maxi-
mum blend price that an initial bidder will offer:
B B* = (NV1 + PT)/(N + T).
Analogously, the maximum third-party blend price can be derived:
B3B* = (NV3 + PT)/(N - T).
There are also similar foreclosure requirements. A treasury share
sale will foreclose third parties from making competitive offers if the
initial blend price, BBI, exceeds the reservation blend price, BiB*:
B1 BI > B*.
Substituting these maximum blend prices into equations (1A) and (2A),
it is possible to derive the maximum or reservation first tier offers:
B B* = [2(NV1 + PT) - P(N + T)2]/(N2 - T2). 7
B B* = [2NV3 - P(N - T)]/(N + T).8
Because of recipient of treasury shares bids for fewer first-tier shares,
having a first-tier price higher than other bidders' does not imply a
higher blend price. Consequently, rational target shareholders choos-
ing the highest blend price may tender their shares to a third party with
a lower front-end offer for more shares. Indeed, if an initial bidder and
a third-party bidder equally value a target (VI = V3), the recipient of
treasury shares will have a higher first-tier reservation price (B,'* >
B3*), but both bidders will have equal reservation blend prices (BB* =
B3*). The overinsurance standard for foreclosure of higher-valuing
third-parties can be equivalently restated in terms of these first-tier res-
ervation prices. Treasury sales will generate foreclosing overinsurance
if BB > BB*.
7. B n * = B *[(N - T)/2] + P[(N + T)/2] = (NV, + PT)/(N + T).
8. B3B* = (B,'* + P)/2 = (NV, + PT)/(N + T).
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